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AbstrAct: This paper analyses the public role of religion in post-communist 
Central Europe by researching perceptions and expectations of people concerning 
different aspects of the social role of religion. The paper argues that the social sig-
nificance of religion should be analysed from the point of view of its ability to fulfil 
different social functions and social expectations connected with it. Based on the 
data from the Aufbruch research project and partly from the International Social 
Survey Project, religious portraits of 13 post-communist countries are presented. 
A more in-depth analysis is done for four countries (Czech Republic, Croatia, Slo-
vakia and Slovenia), since in these countries the differences in the general level 
of religiosity vary significantly, ranging from highly religious (Croatia) to highly 
secularized (Czech Republic). The findings show that social expectations about 
the public role of religion differ due to a social field in which religion is/can be 
engaged and that people’s expectations about the public and social role of religion 
do not always match the general level of religiosity in a specific society.
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Religion as a Public Actor in Post-Communism
Religion was an important part of the social changes connected with the fall of the Berlin 
Wall.1 As an anti-religious political stance was one of the main aspects of communist regimes, 
social and political processes had a substantial religious tint (Tomka 1979, 1991; Zrinščak 
2004), a fact that had become widely recognised with the fall of communism. Such a prominent 
social role of religion has continued to be visible in the post-communist period. The majority 
1 Previous versions of the paper were presented at the ISORECEA conference in Brno (Czech Republic) in 2010 
and at the Croatian Sociological Association National Congress in Zagreb (Croatia) in 2011. The paper benefited 
much from the work carried out at the European Data Laboratory for Comparative Social Research (EUROLAB). 
Access to the EUROLAB was supported by the European Community under the “Structuring the European Re-
search Area” specific programme Research Infrastructures Action in the 6th Framework Programme. We also 
acknowledge support from the scientific project “Social cohesion indicators and development of the Croatian 
social model” (066-0661686-1432), funded by the Ministry of Science, Education and Sport of the Republic of 
Croatia and thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
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of Central and Eastern Europe countries were marked by a religious revitalization at the indi-
vidual and societal level, particularly during the 1990s, although its degree and extent differed 
between countries. Aspects of the public role of religion have been widely discussed in the 
countries in which religious involvement in politics was strengthened by war circumstances 
and/or by the processes of dismantling old states and building new ones (e.g., Pace 2004; Ve-
likonja 2003; Vrcan 1994). However, it could be argued that the issue of the (new) public role 
of religion has become a prominent theme in the sociology of religion in the post-communist 
region. Thus, the issues of social positions of traditional and new religions, of religious rights 
and freedom, and of interconnection between the religious and the national, between reli-
gion and politics, and between religion and the development of democracy, and so on have 
each been addressed in numerous studies (Borowik 1997; Borowik 2006; Cifrić 2000; Hornsby-
Smith 1997; Marinović Jerolimov, Zrinščak and Borowik 2004; Tomka 1995; Tomka and Zul-
ehner 1999; etc.). 
However, it seems that another perspective has become dominant in recent years: the pre-
sumption that, after 20 years of post-communist transition, the European pattern of the secu-
larization process has slowly (but significantly) found its way into the majority of Central and 
Eastern European countries (Müller 2009; Pickel 2009). There has been an argument point-
ing to contextual secularization, which means that secularization is neither linear nor causal 
and that it depends on a number of contextual factors, which are strikingly different among 
countries (Pickel 2011; Pickel and Sammet 2012). This is also formulated as a “differentiated 
theory of secularization that allows for secularization at different levels, at different times and 
at different speeds...” (Pickel, Pollack and Müller 2012, 252). Nevertheless, the secularization 
thesis, even the contextual or differentiated one, continues to question the social significance of 
religion, an issue that is at the core of current debates in the sociology of religion.
There are two related remarks that can be made here. Firstly, as already underlined, religion 
was an important social and political institution in communist times. While the Church had 
no access to the officially controlled public sphere, it was an integral part of the everyday lives 
of the majority of people. Moreover, with the Church being a politically marginalized institu-
tion, though at the same time the only institution that was not totally controlled by politics and 
which had a clear oppositional stand, everything connected with religion and the Church had 
political features. Therefore, the so-called new public role of religion was in post-communism 
has been only partly new—that is, in the sense that new social circumstances occurred that had 
an influence on the aspects of the public role of religion, but not in the sense that religion as-
sumed a significant social and political role that it had not had in the past. Secondly, the public 
role of religion in post-communism could be considered a part of a more global reconfigura-
tion of the religious-social nexus, a fact that has theoretical and methodological consequences. 
Controversies about the role of religion in post-communism are not markedly different from 
similar processes and debates elsewhere. A global review suggests that there are numerous 
variations between secular and sacred and that there is a need “to achieve a fresh perspective, 
notably on the religious as it relates to the political” (Martin 2011, 20), and that contradictory 
tendencies that exist in the world today “have to appear in the same unity of analysis” (Beyer 
2011, 21). 
In light the above considerations, this paper aims to pay closer attention to the public role 
of religion in post-communism, with particular regard to the perceptions and expectations of 
people about different aspects of the social role of religion. We argue that social significance of 
religion should be analysed not only by observing revitalizing or declining religious trends, 
but also from the point of view of the ability of religion to fulfil different social functions.
Our starting theoretical position in that respect is the fact that countries of Central and East-
ern Europe underwent complex changes after WWII, including modernization. The moderni-
zation process was a peculiar one (partial or deviant) as it did not involve political freedom; 
however, its other aspects were in place, such as industrialization, urbanization, deruralization, 
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mass education, and employment of women. Modernization, together with the political en-
forcement of atheism, contributed to the functional differentiation at the societal level. Though 
revitalization has been one important aspect of the post-communist social development, both 
public debates about the social and political role of religion and the Church—in particular, 
debates about whether religion is or should be influencing different public life spheres—and 
a number of studies showed that at least significant parts of the post-communist population 
reject totally or partly the idea of the religion’s influence on other social spheres. In that sense, 
Dobbelaere’s model of different levels of (de)secularization is applicable (Dobbelaere 1999, 
2002). At the societal level, secularization is a consequence of the functional differentiation 
that causes that each social subsystem (polity, economy, science…) to function according to its 
own medium, values, and norms (Dobbelaere, 1999, 230–231). Therefore, they are autonomous 
from religiously prescribed rules. Meso level (or organizational) secularization refers to the 
changes that pluralisation brought at the religious market and, consequently, describes the ad-
aptation of religions to the social processes, whether it is about adaptation, rejections, or other 
forms of organizational changes in religion. The individual level refers to individualization of 
religion (i.e. ways in which religion is used and lived in the private sphere). Thus, trends of 
unbelief, bricolage, decline in Church religiosity, or other forms of subjective religiosity should 
be analysed at this level. Dobbelaere made very clear that secularization is not a mechanical, 
straightforward, evolutionary process, and that there is an open question about how each level 
influences others. One key open question is the nature of what he calls a compartmentalization 
index, an index based on secularization-in-mind—that is, what people think about interfer-
ence of religion to other sub-systems (Dobbelaere 2002, 169). In addition, an important fact is 
that actors can bring significant differences in how secularization evolves in different countries 
(Dobbelaere 2002, 181-187). 
In this regard, the post-communist case is of great interest, as extraordinary social circum-
stances have brought reconfiguration of actors at the societal level and changes in religiosity 
at the individual level. Thus, there are questions that remain unanswered: What do people, 
believers and non-believers, the religious or non-religious, expect from religion? What do they 
expect from religion/religious actors at the individual and societal levels? How do they per-
ceive the role of religion in different parts of everyday life? It is doubtful whether the relation 
between the Church commitment and compartmentalization is strongly negatively related, 
as has been the case in a number of Western European societies (Dobbelaere 2002, 170). On 
the other hand, in another words, it can be asked that, if a person attends Church services 
on a regular basis and prays often, does he or she have a greater expectation from religion’s 
public position, or can a secular person not interested in religion have some expectations from 
religion on a societal level? Another question is whether usual socio-demographic indicators 
of secularization (age, urbanization, and level of education) operate in the same direction in 
relation to the role of religion in society in different post-communist countries.
To sum up, this paper makes a step towards complementing a study of the public role of re-
ligion with people’s expectations about the social functions of religion. In general, we explore 
attitudes and perceptions of people regarding engagement of Churches and religious commu-
nities in the public sphere, and whether those attitudes and perceptions are related with some 
basic socio-religious and socio-demographic characteristics. Since attitudes and perceptions 
reveal what people think about the social role of religion, and what they expect from religion, 
we use the term expectations in the analysis of questions elaborated in more details the next 
section. Specifically, we have explored what people think about the general social role of re-
ligion (for instance, whether they find that Church provides an adequate response in specific 
social fields), about the socio-political role of religion in democracy (for instance, whether they 
find that Church is an important actor in democratic development, the relation between reli-
gion and politics), and the role of religion in regard to various social institutions, particularly 
welfare ones (such as whether people think that Church should have more or fewer specific 
institutions). The latter aspect is a rarely explored one. In that context, the term religion is un-
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derstood in a broader sense (i.e., in the sense of Church-related religion). This is, in the present 
authors’ opinions, justified by the fact that expectations from religion at the societal level can 
be grasped only through the role of Church or any other religious communities. Consequent-
ly, individual religiosity is here viewed through indicators of religious self-identification and 
prayer. 
Thus, the paper follows the argument by one of its authors that studying of the public 
role of religion, and in particular of the Church–state relations, should be complemented with 
study of the social functions of the Church as the basis for understanding the differences in 
normative and actual social position of the Church in different countries (Zrinščak 2011). Simi-
larly, Tomka argued that the issue of Church as a public actor has been neglected in the sociol-
ogy of religion in post-communism and that “the social function and capacity of religion and 
of religious institution are basic frameworks of the interpretation of actual religious situation” 
(Tomka 2007, 107). 
The paper is divided into five parts. After this short theoretical discussion, the research 
design is explained. In order to contribute to the analysis of the social role of religion in post-
communism, the third section introduces basic religious profiles of thirteen Central and East-
ern European countries. Based on these profiles, four countries are selected for further analy-
sis: Croatia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic, countries with profoundly different 
religious situations in which, consequently, people’s expectations about religion can vary sig-
nificantly. The fourth section is devoted to a more detailed analysis of the role of religion and 
people’s expectations concerning this role. The last section summarizes the results and offers 
some general remarks based on the analysis. 
Research Design
The analysis presented in the paper is based on the data coming from the Aufbruch re-
search project and from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). Both surveys are 
cross-national and longitudinal studies based on quantitative research methods. There were 
two waves of the Aufbruch research project, in 1997 and 2007. The first wave covered ten coun-
tries (Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, 
Croatia, and East Germany), while, in 2007, four more countries were included (Moldova, 
Belarus, Serbia, and Bulgaria). The project had a quantitative and qualitative approach, with 
the research goal being to explore religiosity, value orientations, and the position of religions 
in post-socialist countries in Central and Southeast Europe2. The International Social Survey 
Program is a continuous research project with more than forty countries included. The 2008 
module was devoted to religion, with the aim being to explore religious change, impact of 
religion on socio-political attitudes and behaviours, religious pluralism, and conflict, etc.3 The 
analysis done in this paper is based on the 2007 Aufbruch and the 2008 ISSP data. 
Dependent Variables
For the purpose of the analysis, the social role of religion was explored; consequently, vari-
ous variables were used to indicate perceptions/expectations about the social engagement of 
religion.
As an indicator of a general social role of religion, ten variables from two Aufbruch research 
questions were used. The first question concerned the belief that the Catholic Church can re-
spond to moral problems and needs of individuals, problems of family life, questions about 
the meaning of life, and to actual social problems in a given country. The second question con-
cerned the adequacy of big Christian Churches to deal with unemployment, abortion, extra-
2 Tomka and Zulehner (2008).
3 For more information: http://www.issp.org/
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marital status, same-sex relations, growing social differences, and politics of the government. 
The answers to these questions were dichotomous: 1 = yes, 2 = no. 
Three questions were used as indicators of the socio-political role of religion in a democracy. The 
first one comes from the Aufbruch research, where respondents had to express their level of 
agreement with the following statement: “For strengthening democracy it is important to as-
sure that churches would have a role to play”. The second and the third questions come from 
the ISSP research, where respondents were asked about the influence of religious leaders on 
people’s votes and the government. A five-point, Likert-type scale was used (strongly agree = 
5, strongly disagree = 1).
Three questions were used to assess the engagement of religion in specific social institution and 
financial models linked to this engagement (from the Aufbruch research). The first one was 
as follows: “During recent years, churches and religious communities have opened various 
institutions. Would you say that churches and religious communities still have too little or 
already have too many of the following institutions?” The following institutions were listed – 
kindergartens, schools, retirement homes, hospitals, unions, and media4, while answers were 
either still too little (= 1) or already too many (= 2). The second question concerned financing 
of these institutions established by church/religious communities. The answers were: the costs 
of these institutions should be fully paid by believers (= 1); they should be fully paid by the 
state (= 2); partially: one part should be paid/subsidized by the state, the other part by church/
religious community (= 3); the church/religious community should support itself from its own 
resources (= 4); these institutions should be financed through contributors of those individuals 
who actually use these institutions (= 5).
The questions used in these two surveys have revealed many aspects of the social role of 
religion. In this respect, the Aufbruch data are very interesting, especially since other large-
scale comparative researches do not pay much attention to different aspects of the social role of 
religion. Still, it should be underlined that our analysis was restricted by the types of questions 
we had at our disposal.
Independent Variables
With the purpose of exploring a religious landscape in Central and Eastern Europe, the 
indicators of religious self-identification, religious practice (Church attendance and praying), 
and believing in God were used.5 Since the paper aims to analyse the differences in social ex-
pectations from the role of religion, socio-demographic variables—age, level of education, and 
residential status—were also used. Two socio-demographic variables were recorded into three 
groups. For the age variable, the first group is aged 18–39, the second 40–59, and the third 60 
and over. For the education variable, the first group consists of respondents with elementary 
school education or below, the second with high school education, and the third with college, 
university degrees, or higher. 
Religiosity in Central and Eastern Europe: A Basic Profile
Since this paper aims to research the position of religion in the public sphere from the 
standpoint of people’s expectations from religion, some basic data on religiosity (i.e. about 
religious self-identification, religious service attendance and praying, and belief in God) are 
going to be presented first with the aim of exploring the differences among 13 Central and 
Eastern Europe countries. 
4 Since the distribution of answers for kindergartens and schools and retirement homes and hospitals is equal, 
they were averaged out at educational institutions and social and health care institutions.
5 The scale of answers for religious self-identification, religious practice (Church attendance and praying), and 
believing in God are presented in Table 1. In Table 9, the scale of answers for religious self-identification and 
Church practice differ since they come from the ISSP Module Religion 2008, which had different categories than 
those used in the Aufbruch research.
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In the appendix (Table 1), percentages of answers are presented with respect to religious 
self-identification, attendance of religious services in Church (apart from weddings, burial 
ceremonies, and baptisms), frequency of praying, and belief in God. The results suggest there 
are big variations within and between the analysed countries. Basic religious orientation is 
markedly present: in eleven countries out of thirteen, more than 50% of respondents say they 
are either very religious or religious to some extent. By contrast, the vast majority of those who 
declare they are absolutely non-religious are from the Czech Republic (44.6%), a substantive 
minority from Hungary (21.7%), and even a very visible minority from Slovenia (15.4%). How-
ever, the absolutely non-religious are almost non-existent in Romania, Poland, and Moldova. 
The data on religious service make the picture a bit fuzzy. According to this indicator, Po-
land is the most religious and the Czech Republic the least religious country. In Poland alone, 
more than two-thirds of respondents attend religious services regularly (weekly or monthly), 
while in the Czech Republic over 60% never go to Church, which is in line with the indicator 
about self-identification. In all other countries, the levels of Church attendance are not in ac-
cordance with religious self-identification, as Church attendance has much lower values. 
The results on the frequency of praying as one of the indicators of religiosity are more in 
line with the indicators of religious self-identification. The Romanian respondents pray most 
frequently out of all respondents from Central and Eastern Europe (81.5% pray on weekly 
basis), while 66.8% of Czechs do not pray at all. Over 50% of people from Poland (as much as 
66%), Moldova, Croatia and Slovakia pray at least once a week. 
The indicator connected with believing in God confirms high variations in the religious 
landscape of post-communist countries. With the exception of Hungary, Slovenia and the 
Czech Republic, in all other countries at least two thirds of people claim they believe in God. 
In several countries, this belief is rather widespread, making it almost impossible to find an 
atheist. On the other hand, only one third of people believe in God in the Czech Republic. In-
terestingly, in all countries the level of belief in God is higher that the number of those declar-
ing themselves as being religious. 
In order to find a more consistent pattern of religiosity, a ranking system of all countries 
was introduced based on religious indicators presented in Table 1. Table 2 presents ranked 
mean values for each of the indicators of religiosity, while for the belief in God the countries 
are ranked according to the percentages of “yes” answers.
Based on the ranking of the countries in Table 2, four groups of countries can be derived. 
The group with the most religious countries includes Poland, Romania, Moldova, and Croatia, 
which are all ranked first according to all of the indicators. The group comprising religious 
countries that are in principle ranked in the middle of the scale includes Ukraine, Slovakia, 
Belarus, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Lithuania. The group with less religious countries includes Slo-
venia and Hungary, which, with one exception, appear to be at the bottom of the scale. The 
fourth “group” consists in fact of only one country: the Czech Republic, as the most secular-
ized according to all of the indicators. Though the grouping of countries seems to be sound, we 
are aware of the lack of a consistent criterion of division within each of the indicators, which, 
consequently, leads to a subjective division. However, in developing the ranking system, we 
have also relied on the indicator of religious belonging, which is not presented in Table 1, but 
is in accordance with other indicators from the same table. The Aufbruch data show that, in the 
countries included in the first group, around 90% or more of the respondents declare religious 
belonging, which makes this group different from the second one, in which, with the exception 
of Lithuania, religious belonging varies between around 70% and 80%.
In order to continue with a more in-depth analysis, one country from each of these four 
groups was chosen: Croatia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic, respectively. Com-
parison of these four countries is suitable due to the mutual communist history and experience 
of living in federative states in the 20th century (Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia), but also 
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Religious
Self-Identification (mean)
Church Practice (mean) Prayer (mean) Beliving in God
Romania Poland Romania Poland
Poland Romania Poland Romania
Croatia Croatia Moldova Moldova
Moldova Moldova Croatia Croatia
Serbia Slovakia Slovakia Ukraine
Lithuania Lithuania Ukraine Slovakia
Slovakia Bulgaria Serbia Belarus
Belarus Ukraine Bulgaria Bulgaria
Ukraine Slovenia Belarus Serbia
Bulgaria Belarus Lithuania Lithuania
Hungary Serbia Hungary Slovenia
Slovenia Hungary Slovenia Hungary
Czech Republic Czech Republic Czech Republic Czech Republic
table 2: Ranking of the countries according to religiosity. Source: Aufbruch 2007
Most Religious Religous Less Religious Secular
because of the Catholic background in all of them. However, the main goal was to see if and 
how the differences in the social role of religion according to people’s views were connected 
with the differences in religiosity in various countries.
The Social Role of Religion
The General Social Role
A sociological perspective observes religions in their social action, which is framed in terms 
of their guiding principles. In other words, sociology tries to explore and understand the so-
cio-cultural imprint of religion(s) on society. However, the question is how these guiding prin-
ciples shape a very concrete social practice. In order to asses that, some of the questions from 
the Aufbruch research project were used, which can be perceived as indicators of a general role 
of religion in society with a view to exploring the attitudes on this role, presented in Tables 3 
and 4.
The highest expectations from the Catholic Church in all four countries are connected with 
the question about the meaning of life. To a lesser extent, the Catholic Church is expected to 
respond to moral problems and needs of individuals, and even less to the problems of family 
life. The action upon actual social problems in respective countries is seen as the least response 
that religion is least able to provide. There is an evident connection between the general level 
of religiosity explored in the previous section of the paper and the belief in the responses of 
Church from Table 3. In all four aspects, the belief in the ability of the Church to respond is 
lower in less religious countries than in more religious ones, although there are important dif-
ferences in relation to different issues.
 In respect of various social issues (Table 4), the respondents have a different opinion about 
the appropriateness of big Christian Churches to deal with them. One of the most accepted 
issues that Churches are believed to be able to deal with are growing social differences, fol-
lowed by unemployment. This was expected, as these are the most pressing social issues con-
nected with the transition from communism to a market economy. These answers suggest a 
widespread distrust in political institutions—that are unable to resolve social problems people 
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Croatia Slovakia Slovenia Czech Republic
β
Age .030 .050 .134*** .037
Education .016 .027 .067 .060*
Residential status -.021 .034 .005* -.040
Religious self-identification -.278*** -.206*** -.191*** -.238***
Church practice -.218*** -.308*** -.132** -.246***
Prayer -.120** -.123** -.237*** -.117*
R .547 .600 .553 .564
R2 .299 .360 .305 .318
table 5: General social role of religion index (linear regression)
Source: Aufbruch 2007 | ***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05
For strengthening democracy, it is important to assure that churches
would have a role to play
(fully) disagree neither disagree nor agree (fully) agree
Croatia 38.1 26.1 35.8
Slovakia 33.3 31.3 35.4
Slovenia 58.6 24.3 17.0
Czech Republic 52.7 26.2 21.1
table 6: For strengthening democracy, it is important to assure that churches would have a role to 
play
Source: Aufbruch 2007
Croatia Slovakia Slovenia
Czech
Republic
Moral problems and needs of individuals 56.3 47.9 45.6 40.5
Problems of family life 55.1 52.5 42.1 34.5
Questions about meaning of life 64.5 66.8 53.4 50.3
Actual social problems in our country 37.2 35.4 31 26.5
table 3: Believing that the Catholic Church can respond to the (only yes answers) %
Source: Aufbruch 2007
Croatia Slovakia Slovenia
Czech
Republic
Unemployment 58 56.4 36.4 47.2
Abortion 48.8 51.6 31.5 30.3
Extramarital relations 50.7 57.5 32.7 36.2
Same-sex relations 52.1 53 32.2 30.7
Growing social differences 70.3 63.8 49 52.9
Politics of the government 30.1 36 19.5 33
table 4: Appropriateness of big Christian Churches to deal with (only yes answers) %
Source: Aufbruch 2007
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face in their everyday life—, but also a high expectation from religious institutions to resolve 
these problems. This kind of expectation is highest in Croatia, as the most religious out of 
the four countries, and the lowest in Slovenia (and not in the Czech Republic, though it is the 
most secularized country!). On the other hand, the lowest expectation is connected with the 
ability of the Church to deal with politics of government. Although people do not trust much 
in the ability of political institutions, they do not think it appropriate that the Church deals 
with politics. Abortion, extramarital relations, and same-sex relations are often addressed by 
big Christian Churches. In that respect, acceptance is also present, though in different degrees. 
The Czech and Slovakian respondents think that it is more appropriate for the Church to deal 
with extramarital relations than with abortion and same-sex relations. In Croatia slightly, over 
50% of respondents consider that the Church can adequately deal with the issues of same-sex 
relations and extramarital-relations, while this is not the case with abortion (48.8% think that 
Church can appropriately deal with this topic). 
Although questions presented in Tables 3 and 4 have different wording, they are both aimed 
at capturing people’s expectations concerning religion with regard to various social aspects. 
That is why we have decided to construct an index, since the scale of answers is the same for 
both questions.6 This index is analysed as the general social role of religion index and is treated 
as a criteria variable in the regression analysis. Predicting variables are socio-demographic 
variables (age, level of education, and residential status) and religiosity variables (religious 
self-identification, Church practice, and frequency of prayer).
In respect of socio-demographic predictors, there are differences among the Croatian, Slo-
vakian, Slovenian, and Czech respondents. Croatian and Slovakian respondents do not differ 
with regard to socio-demographic variations, while there is a higher level of probability that, 
in Slovenia, the elderly and those living in rural places would expect more from the social 
engagement of religion. In the Czech Republic, the same is true only of those who are less 
educated. Religiosity is the strongest predictor in all four countries. Those who identify them-
selves as more religious and those who practice their religion more often tend to have higher 
expectations about the social engagement of religion. It should also be noted that variance 
explained in the regression model in all four countries is rather high for this kind of analysis. 
The Socio-Political Role of Religion in Democracy
The relation between religion and democracy is a hotly debated topic, and opinions dif-
fer, ranging from congruence between religion and democracy to major discrepancy between 
them (e.g., Göle 2010; Sandel 1996; Stepan 2002 etc.). The previous section confirmed that the 
public has the lowest expectations about the engagement of religion with the politics of the 
government. Similar discrepancy in attitudes/expectations about the engagement of religion 
has been detected recently in another analysis, which has, based on the same Aufbruch data, 
argued that people distinguish socio-cultural and socio-political roles of religion (Ančić 2011). 
Bearing this in mind, the aforementioned three indicators were used as measuring expecta-
tions about the political role of religion in democratic societies.
Percentages pertaining to the question about the importance of assuring the role of Church 
in strengthening democracy are presented in Table 6. Comparison among the countries has 
revealed a clear pattern. On one side, there are Croatia and Slovakia as more religious coun-
tries; on the other, there are Slovenia and the Czech Republic as less religious or even secu-
lar countries. Irrespective of that, it is interesting to note that Croatian respondents are split 
in their opinions: 38.1% (fully) disagree with the statement compared to 35.8% who (fully) 
agree. Similar (dis)approval is present in Slovakia. Although religiosity in these two countries 
is higher than in the other two, the level of religiosity only partially explains (dis)approval of 
6 Reliability analysis for the scale shows that Cronbach’s α for all four countries is 0.882. For Croatia it is 0.861, 
for Slovakia 0.899, for Slovenia 0.889, while for the Czech Republic it is 0.854. Although the values of Cronbach’s 
α are different in all four countries, it is obvious that the validity of those variables allows us to construct an 
index.
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Croatia Slovakia Slovenia Czech Republic
β
Age .067* .012 .100*** .065*
Education -.004 -.007 -.030 -.026
Residential status .080** .078** .067** -.026
Religious self-identification -.172*** -.247*** -.207*** -.277***
Church practice -.236*** -.248*** -.335*** -.236***
Prayer -.142** -.087 -.067 -.100*
R .521 .554 .624 .595
R2 .272 .307 .389 .354
table 7: For strengthening democracy, it is important to assure that churches would have a role to 
play (linear regression)
Source: Aufbruch 2007 | ***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05
Croatia Slovakia Slovenia
Czech
Republic
Religious leaders should not influence people’s 
votes
84.6 74.3 82.7 73.7
Religious leaders should not influence govern-
ment
80.5 70.2 82.5 69.4
table 8: Influence of religious leaders on people’s votes and government (only answers (strongly) 
agree) %
Source: ISSP 2008
Croatia Slovakia Slovenia
Czech 
Republic
Croatia Slovakia Slovenia
Czech 
Republic
Religious leaders should not influence 
people’s vote
Religious leaders should not influence 
government
β
Age -.021 .001 -.005 -.014 -.011 -.029 -.022 -.030
Education -.052 .002 -.025 -.036 .029 -.013 -.017 -.022
Residential status -.002 .075* -.033 -.045 .031 .078* -.013 -.036
Religious
self-identification
-.107* -.206*** -.084 -.100* -.088* -.212*** -.090 -.105*
Church practice -.026 -.060 .004 -.134** -.118** -.122* .000 -.181
Prayer -.018 .096 -.038 .001 .000 .094 -.088 -.022***
R .156 .208 .117 .219 .189 .267 .166 .278
R2 .024 .043 .014 .048 .036 .071 .028 .077
table 9: Influence of religious leaders on people’s voting and government (linear regression)
Source: ISSP 2008 | ***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05
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the role of the Church in democracy, contrasting to the perceptions of its role in the previously 
analysed social issues. 
Table 7 presents the results from the linear regression analysis with socio-demographic and 
religiosity indicators.
There is a difference according to the residential status in Croatia, Slovakia, and Slovenia, 
as respondents living in urban places are less supportive of the role of the Church in strength-
ening democracy, while this is true only of younger respondents in the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia. Religiosity is a significant predictor in all four countries. Those respondents who are 
more religious are also more in favour of the statement that it is important to assure that the 
Church has a role to play. There are two exceptions in that regard. The frequency of praying, 
as one of the indicators of religiosity, does not correlate with this statement in Slovenia and 
Slovakia. In addition, the expectation about assuring the position of religion in the process of 
strengthening democracy does not say much about that type of position. Thus, the question is 
to what extent religion can be engaged in the field of politics?
The results indicated in Table 8 stand in contrast to previous data. A significant majority of 
respondents in all four countries are opposed to the influence of religious leaders on people’s 
votes and the government. If one would look at these results not knowing much about the 
religiosity in these four countries, one could possibly come to a conclusion that these countries 
are highly secularized, with Croatia the most secularized among them. There is a firm refusal 
of the idea that religious leaders should influence the voting and government, irrespective 
of the high level of religiosity and high level of the public presence of religion, such as in the 
case of Croatia. It is obvious that the data about the general level of religiosity do not have any 
predictive power of explaining the relation between religion and politics, at least not in Central 
European countries. Although there is much more to politics than people’s votes or the work 
of government, the expectations about the engagement of religion in the field of politics do not 
match the broader socio-religious structure of the four analysed societies.
The data shown in Table 9 suggest that socio-demographic differences appear to be present 
only in Slovakia, where urban respondents are more opposed to religion influencing politics. 
Religiosity as a predictor in the regression model shows its significance in Croatia, Slovakia, 
and the Czech Republic, while, in Slovenia, none of the three indicators of religiosity is corre-
lated with this attitude. Concerning attitude on religious leaders influencing people’s vote in 
Croatia and Slovakia, only those who identify themselves as being more religious accept that 
idea, while in the Czech Republic it is the case also with those who attend Church regularly. 
Similar acceptance is visible with the idea of religious leaders influencing government, which 
is more characteristic for Croatian, Slovakian, and Slovenian regular churchgoers and self-
identified religious persons, while in the Czech Republic this is only the case with the latter. 
Although religiosity seems to be a significant predictor, the variance explained in this model 
(pseudo R2) is significantly lower than in the regression models on the social role of religion. 
Therefore, as already concluded based on the data presented in Table 8, the link between re-
ligiosity and the expectations about the influence of religion on politics is very weak. 
Engagement of Religion and Specific Social Institutions
From the above-noted differences, it may be concluded that a general social role and socio-
political role do not explain a particular role in different social fields, particularly the welfare 
one. Therefore, in Table 10 the analysis is extended with opinions on specific institutions and 
with people’s readiness to participate with their own financial contributions.
The expectation about religious communities establishing various social institutions varies 
in these four countries, revealing quite differentiated perception of the engagement of religion. 
Several things should be underlined here. First, the highest expectations concern the involve-
ment of religion in the establishment of educational (kindergartens and schools) and social 
and health care institutions (retirement homes and hospitals). Over 85% of respondents think 
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During recent years, churches and religious communities have opened various institutions. Would you say that 
churches and religious communities still have too little or already have too many of the following institutions? 
%
Croatia Slovakia Slovenia
Czech
Republic
Still to little
Unions 62.6 44.6 37.0 48.8
Media 50.6 58.1 28.2 62.7
Educational institutions 84.7 65.0 54.3 74.6
Social and health service institutions 90.7 85.7 70.6 86.5
What is your opinion? %
The costs of these institutions should be fully 
paid by believers
4.9 6.9 13.4 17.5
They should be fully paid by the state 10.9 13.8 6.3 4.9
Partially: one part should be paid/subsidized 
by the state, the other part by church/religious 
community
52.8 41.6 32.9 35.6
The church/religious community should support 
itself from its own resources
22.4 25.2 36.7 25.1
These institutions should be financed through 
contributions of those individuals who actually 
use these institutions
9.0 12.5 10.6 16.9
If it would be necessary for supporting of your religious community, would you be ready to pay a regular con-
tribution to the church/religious community of church taxes? % 
No 54.4 46.5 67.5 60.6
Yes 41.9 49.0 27.7 15.5
I do not belong to any religious community 3.7 4.4 4.9 23.9
table 10: Religion and social institutions—expectations and readiness to take part in financing them
Source: Aufbruch 2007
Church and religious communities have too few social and health care institutions in Croatia, 
Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. Only in Croatia did the majority of people (over 50%) ex-
pect more institutions in all of the listed fields to be established by the Church. Interestingly, 
the expectations here also do not follow general religious differences between these countries, 
since in the Czech Republic respondents expect more religious media than in the other three 
countries and also have higher expectations than people from Slovenia and Slovakia concern-
ing unions, educational, social and health care institutions. Slovenes have the lowest level of 
expectations among the four countries concerning unions, and especially the media, as over 
70% say that the Church and religious communities already have too many media institutions. 
The results regarding the question about financing these institutions is also only to some 
extent in accordance with a general religious profile of a country. In Croatia, Slovakia, and 
the Czech Republic, the majority would approve a model in which state and religious com-
munities share the costs pertaining to these institutions. Only in Slovenia did the majority 
think institutions should be financed by religious communities. After that, people were asked 
if they would be ready to pay a regular contribution of Church taxes to the Church/religious 
community if it was necessary to support their religious community. The majority of people 
from Croatia, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia said they were not ready to make financial 
contributions; only in Slovakia did the majority of respondents say they were willing to do so. 
Once again, Slovenian people turned out to be less inclined towards religion in this respect 
than people in the Czech Republic were.
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Croatia Slovakia Slovenia
Czech
Republic
Odds ratio
Age -.010* .010 .009 -.016
Education .019 .284 .011 .143
Residential status .288 .569** -.377 -.117
Religious self-identification -.504*** -.782*** -1.026*** -.466**
Church practice -.222** -.437*** -.162 -.488***
Prayer -.273*** -.105 -.240** -.331**
Cox & Snell R2 .204 .317 .313 .321
Nagelkerke R2 .274 .423 .447 .503
table 11: Readiness to pay regular contribution to church/religious community (logistic regression)
Source: Aufbruch 2007 | ***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05
Table 11 shows that in all four countries, those who are more religious are also more willing 
to contribute financially to their religious community. However, there are some differences 
that are not in line with the country ranking according to the general level of religiosity (Table 
2). The odds ratio from logistic regression shows that the Slovenian religious respondents 
are less willing to contribute financially than the Czech religious respondents are. Some of 
the socio-demographic predictors are only significant in Croatia and Slovakia, indicating that 
younger Croatian respondents and Slovak urban respondents are less ready to support their 
religious communities financially. 
Discussion and Conclusion
Being for decades one of the dominant approaches in the sociology of religion, seculariza-
tion theory questions the social significance of religion, arguing predominantly about its di-
minishing social relevance and influence in line with the declining religiosity. However, and 
as underlined in the first section of the paper, this is not a straightforward process, and there 
is no simple relationship between different social levels. Besides, social and cultural particu-
larities together with the influence of actors can make a significant difference in the interplay 
of social and religious changes in different countries (Dobbelaere 2002). However, there are 
many other approaches to analysing social and religious changes from partly or completely 
different perspectives, which can be very roughly grouped into (1) those which pay attention 
to the (re?)emergence of the public role of religions, (2) those which are focused on non-tradi-
tional ways of religiosity (from new religious movements through research on spirituality to 
a focus on lived religion and individual religious experience in everyday life), and (3) those 
who try to trace the role of religion and religious institutions in different social and individual 
arenas (such as in education, welfare institutions, prisons, etc.). This confirms the complexity 
of social life in contemporary societies, which, consequently, has different impacts on the role 
of religion in different social subsystems. As also elaborated in the first section of this paper, 
sociological discussions in the post-communist region have been only partly different from 
the discussions elsewhere. Post-communist discussions have been particularly focused on the 
role of religion and Church as significant actors in the post-communist social order. Although 
the religious situation varies considerably among the countries, the issues of rising religiosity 
and the strong influence of Church in the public sphere, and possible consequences of such 
influence, have been at the core of debate (Pickel and Sammet 2012). At the same time, relying 
both on dominant social trends (such as rapid modernization of post-communist countries) 
and the aforementioned differences among the countries, there is an attempt to track secular-
izing tendencies. The approach used in this paper has been somewhat different. The present 
authors do not question numerous studies that have contributed to an understanding of reli-
gion or religious changes in post-communism from a variety of approaches. On the contrary, 
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the paper aims to complement them by shifting the focus to the role of religion in different 
social areas and, in particular, to people’s opinions and expectations about the role of religion 
in everyday life. 
In order to sketch its variety and complexity, the religious landscape of Central and East-
ern European countries was described first with the use of basic sociological indicators for 13 
countries. These were ranked, based on which four countries were selected as representative 
for further analysis (Croatia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic), a choice that was 
justified by subsequent results. The social role of religion was analysed from three angles. 
Firstly, the general social role was observed. This was attempted to be captured through the 
questions about the possibility of the Church to provide responses in different areas of social 
and individual life (moral problems, family life, meaning of life, and actual social problems) 
and the appropriateness of the Church to deal with different issues, such as unemployment, 
abortion, extramarital relations, same-sex marriages, etc. 
Secondly, the socio-political role of religion in democracy was looked at, which was ap-
proached through the questions on the role of the Church in strengthening democracy and on 
the influence of religious leaders on people’s votes and the government. 
Thirdly, religious engagement in specific social fields was observed—particularly, the pos-
sibility of establishing Church-owned institutions (unions, media, educational and welfare 
institutions), and their financing. All of these variables were further explored in the regression 
analysis by adding socio-demographic and religious indicators. 
A number of interesting results were obtained. As the results were discussed in the previ-
ous section, here they will be only briefly summarized. 
Firstly, the majority of people in the four Central European countries are of the opinion that 
there is a place for a public role of religion and the Church. They stated that religion can and 
should be engaged in various social issues. Religion is even considered, though there are dif-
ferences in this respect, to be important for the strengthening of democracy. 
Secondly, the place of religion and the Church is not only connected with the “natural” 
religious role, such as giving answers to the meaning of life, or offering moral advice in rela-
tion to abortion, extramarital relation, and same-sex marriages. It is also connected with those 
issues that are at the heart of what can be labelled as a successful, yet slow and painful, tran-
sition from communism to democracy and market economy. This is a process that brought 
major disappointment with the way in which the new social order has been put in place, and 
a process that produced a significant number of “losers of transition” (EBRD, 2007). Therefore, 
although the ability of religion to be engaged in resolving social problems is not regarded as 
high (Table 3), the respondents do expect it to discuss unemployment and growing social dif-
ferences. 
Thirdly, the social engagement of religion does not mean it should assume a political role. 
Moreover, in all countries (including those more religious), the significant majority of respond-
ents oppose the political role and any explicit influence on people’s votes and on the govern-
ment. This can, of course, provoke an interesting debate about what the social and the political 
are; however, elaborating on this is not within the remit of the present paper. 
Fourthly, the Church can be publicly present by establishing different social institutions, 
such as the media, educational, social or health service institutions. Church-owned health 
and social service institutions are welcomed by the significant majority of respondents in all 
countries. 
Fifthly, as was expected, there are major differences among the countries in relation to 
different issues. However, the level of religiosity does not account for all the differences. In 
relation to the general social role and to the links between Church and democracy, religiosity 
is a strong predictor: greater religiosity equals greater support. Still, this is only partly true for 
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an explicit religious-political nexus (as there is a sizeable opposition to such a role in all coun-
tries), and is not true in relation to establishing and financing of Church-owned institutions. 
The Czech case is of particular interest here, as, despite the comparatively very low level 
of religiosity, the majority of people think there are too few Church-owned social institutions; 
this would usually not be expected in a highly secularized country. The Croatian case also un-
derlines that greater religiosity and opposition to some aspect of the public role of Church can 
exist in parallel. Thus, the fact that there is a discrepancy between the presence and expectancy 
of religion’s rhetoric in the public sphere and the acceptance of religious teachings by citizens 
(Carter 1993) should be researched more systematically in the future.  
In some aspects, the analysis confirmed what had been already discussed for Western Eu-
ropean countries: a strong opposition to the religious influence on government policy or on 
public office, but a space to be engaged in various social issues, thus affirming a possibility for 
religion to be a spiritual, ethical, and cultural resource (Lambert 1998, 231). The same was also 
partly noted for a number of post-communist countries (Pollack and Pickel 2009). In one of the 
rare analyses of social expectations about the public role of the Church in post-communism, 
Tomka (2007, 113-114) underlines that it is not the majority, but, rather, big social groups that 
advocate the competence and public appearance of the Church, that the Church’s teaching and 
declarations have social legitimacy, and that the position of the Church on social issues attracts 
greater acceptance than attitudes linked to private morality do. Therefore, our analysis dem-
onstrates further that the functional differentiation does not necessarily mean that there is no 
(at least partial) influence of religion on other social subsystems (except for politics), and that 
there is no straightforward relation between religiosity at the societal and individual level and 
attitudes toward the religion’s social role. Nevertheless, the paper demonstrates also the need 
for more in-depth analysis in that respect. This also constitutes an impetus to continue with 
what would be observed as a kind of alternative approach to the study on the social signifi-
cance of religion. Hence, the analysis has, for example, found that “it is clear that the majority 
of churches of Europe, though diminished in terms of numbers, are still important players in 
the lives of many Europeans (an argument for persistence) and that their role in the delivery of 
welfare is growing rather than declining” (Bäckström and Davie 2011, 70). 
We believe this paper contributes to the analyses of the public role of religion, in particular 
by underlying the need to differentiate among different social levels and different social fields, 
and warns against a simple conclusion about the role of religion in a particular society based 
on the general level of religiosity. Nevertheless, it has a number of shortcomings. Two of them 
are worth mentioning. First, our analysis was restricted by the survey questions we had at 
our disposal. In this respect, the Aufbruch data offer more possibilities of understanding the 
social role of religion than other comparative researches (such as the EVS, WVS, ISSP, and oth-
ers). However, the way some questions were formulated and their meaning leave a room for 
further discussions. Secondly, the analysis remains explorative in its nature. In particular, we 
did not extend it by looking deeper at country specificities, which might shed further light on 
some of the answers. 
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Romania 83.6 12.9 3.5 27.6 25.7 25.5 16.9 4.2 65.5 16 6.1 2.8 7.4 2.3 97.9
Moldova 77.1 15.6 7.2 12.2 18.7 32.1 31 6 41.1 17.6 8.2 8 19.4 5.7 96.3
Poland 76.5 15.6 7.8 52.5 21.9 15 5.9 4.7 42.3 23.4 10.6 9.6 8 6 95.4
Croatia 74 12.2 13.8 23.3 17.2 26.7 15.3 17.5 35.7 15.3 11 9.7 12.6 15.7 91.6
Slovakia 65.9 18.2 15.8 25.4 21.9 7.3 17.9 27.4 32.3 17.9 7.3 8.4 17.7 16.3 87.2
Bulgaria 52.2 28.6 19.3 6.6 17.9 44.9 18.8 11.8 16 14.7 13.4 19.6 19.2 17.1 83.1
Serbia 68.2 21.4 10.4 6.6 11.9 39.5 24.1 17.8 21.9 13.9 10.9 15.6 20.3 17.4 80.6
Ukraine 64 16.1 19.7 13.6 13.4 31.9 24.7 16.4 29.3 14.5 9.7 14.6 9 23 79.1
Lithuania 64.4 23.5 12 8.3 20.8 36.5 20.9 13.5 12.3 7.3 13.5 19.4 18.8 28.6 76.1
Belarus 62.2 17.8 20 8.6 10.4 39 24.5 17.5 17.6 13.3 10.6 15 12.4 31 75.2
Hungary 52.4 19 28.7 9.9 8.8 18.5 27.9 34.9 18.7 11 5.7 6.6 21.2 36.8 62.8
Slovenia 46.8 21.6 31.5 16.3 12.1 20.8 26.3 24.5 13.6 12.6 6.7 11.3 17.9 38 55.2
Czech Republic 23 11.4 65.6 6.4 4.4 8.9 17.4 62.9 9.5 5.1 3.5 4.5 10.5 66.8 33.4
table 1: Religious self-identification, church practice, praying, and belief in God in Central and 
Eastern Europe (%)
